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Abstract
This paper puts the PIN variable (Probability of INformation-based
trading) to test. We find that for a large set of stocks, the PIN vari-
able is lower (albeit insignificantly) in the periods before earnings an-
nouncements dates than in the periods after earnings announcements
dates. This is inconsistent with the idea of PIN capturing the proba-
bility of informed trading.
Introduction
RECENT RESEARCH in financial market microstructure has tried to esti-
mate the probability that a given stock is subject to informed trading over
a certain period of time. An important contribution in this direction is the
work of Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara and Paperman (1996)(henceforth EKOP) and
Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002)(henceforth EHO). Based on previous
theoretical work [Easley and O’Hara (1987, 1992) and Easley, Kiefer and
O’ Hara (1997)] these authors impose an assumed microstructure model on
the data and then estimate the model’s parameters in order to construct
an estimate of the probability of informed trading (PIN). Key elements of
their microstructure model are the assumptions that information events oc-
cur (with a given probability) independently on a daily basis, that there is
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at most one information event per day and that informed investors1 act on
these events the very same day that they occur. If the news is good, informed
traders will enter the market and more “buy” orders will be placed. If the
news is bad, there will be more “sell” orders. In each case, the number of
buy and sell orders are assumed to independently follow Poisson distribu-
tions. Using actual stock trade prices and quotes, the authors classify trades
as buy or sell-initiated and use them to estimate the parameters of the Pois-
son distributions via maximum likelihood. These parameters then become
the building blocks of the PIN variable, which is the ratio of the expected
number of informed trades over the expected total number of trades. Thus,
the PIN variable being a number between zero and one, should capture the
probability of informed trading. EHO (2002) estimate the PIN variable an-
nually for each common stock listed on NYSE from 1983 to 1998.
The PIN has in the meantime been widely used as an explanatory variable
in studying the relationship between informed trading and a variety of phe-
nomena that includes among others, spreads of less frequently traded stocks
[EKOP (1996)], stock splits [Easley, O’Hara, Saar (2001)], stock analyst cov-
erage [Easley, O’Hara, Paperman (1998)], cross-sectional expected returns
[Easley, Hvidkjaer, O’Hara (2002)], purchased order flows [Easley, Kiefer,
O’Hara (1996)] and ownership structure [Dennis, Weston (2001)]. Easley,
Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2005) use the returns of high and low-PIN portfolios
to construct a risk factor that is shown to have some success in explaining
portfolio returns, while Vega (2005) uses it in a test of market efficiency.
In most of these papers, the PIN variable is implicitly assumed to work
(i.e., it accurately captures the probability of informed trading) and is then
used as a tool to test hypotheses about the effect of informed trading on these
other variables of interest. In these studies, the effect of informed trading on
the other variables is usually not ex-ante clear-cut; that is, there are theo-
retical arguments predicting both positive and negative relationships. If the
theoretical arguments pointed in one specific direction only and the empirical
findings confirmed the theory, then that would be significant evidence that
PIN does work. To the extent however that PIN does play a significant role
in affecting other variables in one or the other direction, one might be sus-
picious that perhaps PIN is simply correlated with some other variable. To
address this issue the authors of the above papers try to control for potential
1“Informed” are considered to be the investors with superior information and/or above-
average skills, such as analysts.
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correlations of PIN. For example, in EKOP (1996) the microstructure model
that the authors assume, predicts a direct positive relationship between the
PIN variable and the bid-ask spread. In empirical tests, the authors verify
that indeed less frequently traded stocks with larger bid-ask spreads have on
average higher PINs. To control for the possibility that the observed negative
relationship between spreads and volume is due to some reason other than
informed trading risk, EKOP (1996) regress:
Σ = β0 + β1 · V · PIN + β2 · V + ²
where Σ is the spread and V is volume. They find that the coefficient β1
is significant and positive, suggesting that PIN and informed trading have
explanatory power over spreads, beyond any other volume-related factors.
Although this finding is consistent with PIN and the underlying model
being correct, there may be other factors positively correlated with PIN and
spreads and at the same time negatively correlated with volume that drive
these empirical regularities. For example, a stock that is characterized by
high information asymmetry among investors is also likely to be characterized
by high information asymmetry between insiders and investors in general. In
such a case, one could be observing low trading volumes because of an adverse
selection effect, with the high spreads then showing up potentially due to an
inventory effect. One could argue of course that if the PIN is correlated with
some other factor and this factor is then correlated with the degree of infor-
mation asymmetry between investors, then the PIN is effectively correlated
with the probability of informed trading. However, this is not necessarily the
case, because asymmetry of information and informed trading are not the
same thing. Overall, we feel that the literature on PIN provides only weak
evidence of its effectiveness. Confirming this, a recent study by Mohanram
and Rajgopal (2006) finds that PIN is not a priced risk-factor in the cross-
section of stock returns when the sample time period is extended relative to
the one in EHO(2002).
The theoretical objection against PIN is that it is based on assumptions
that do not seem very realistic. For instance, information events may not be
independent across days; it is natural to imagine situations where good or
bad news arrives over a sequence of days, which are then followed by days
characterized by the complete absence of any news. Also, for various reasons
informed investors may not trade on their private information the same day
they acquired it. More importantly, the PIN does not take into account in
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any way the number of shares bought or sold in any given trade2. Previous
empirical work [Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara (1997a) and (1997b)] based on mod-
els similar to the ones used for the construction of PIN, has produced mixed
results as to whether trade size has any information content. Easley, Kiefer,
O’Hara (1997a) thus conclude that the effect of trade size on information
is “model specific”. However, there is still a strong intuition that informed
traders are likely to trade more heavily the stock for which they have ac-
quired information. If this is true, then the PIN probably misses a good part
of the information content of trades. For example, one can imagine that an
informed investor who trades frequently and holds a broad portfolio of stocks
will act on his information by simply reweighting his portfolio, without nec-
essarily changing the number of trades. This case would go undetected by
PIN. From a theoretical point of view, these arguments cast doubt on the
reliability of PIN as an estimate of the probability of informed trading.
In this paper, we subject the PIN variable to a test. Our goal is to see
whether it is consistent with a hypothesis that we think should be true if
PIN is a reliable estimator of the informed trading probability. The idea is
to compare for each stock a PIN that has been calculated using data from
days that precede the Earnings Announcement Dates (EADs) to a PIN that
has been calculated using data from days that follow Earnings Announce-
ment Dates. Since on EADs a good amount of information about a given
company becomes public, it is natural to think that there is more information
asymmetry between investors and therefore more opportunities for informed
trading on the days prior to EADs, than on the days after. The information
asymmetry argument is verified by Brooks (1996) who uses an econometric
model proposed by Hasbrouck (1991) to measure the degree of information
asymmetry prior and after information events such as earnings and dividend
announcements. The measure for information asymmetry is the variance of
quote revisions attributable to private information, over the total variance
of quote revisions. Consistent with the idea of less informational asymmetry
after a public information event, the author finds that this ratio substantially
decreases following an earnings announcement.
However, what we need for our test to be valid is not information asym-
metry per se, but informed trading. The former is a necessary condition
for the latter, but not a sufficient one. In this direction, Amin and Lee
2For a measure of informed trading that does take volume into account, see Bernhardt
and Hughson (2002).
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(1997) show that a greater proportion of long positions is initiated in the
call option market immediately before good earnings news on the underlying
stock. Of course, this study examines what happens in the option market but
the option market and the stock market are linked: any unusual/informed
trading activity prior to an earnings announcement in the first, should also
spread in the second as the informed option traders delta-hedge their posi-
tions. Christophe, Ferri and Angel (2004) document a significant negative
relationship between the amount of short selling prior to an EAD and the
immediate post-announcement change in stock prices. This is direct evidence
of informed trading prior to EADs since short-sellers are unlikely to be noise
traders.
More striking evidence of informed trading prior to earnings announce-
ments is provided by Frazzini and Lamont (2006) who find strong support for
the “attention catching” hypothesis around EADs. Their work shows that
small investors trade heavily right after an earnings announcement, presum-
ably because the announcement caught their attention (hence the name of the
hypothesis). This causes the stocks’ returns to increase substantially. How-
ever, the price appreciation usually begins ten days prior to the announce-
ment, suggesting that informed trading might be taking place. Consistent
with this explanation, the authors document an abnormal amount of large
trades3 in the ten-day period leading to an earnings announcement. Figure
1, taken from their paper, illustrates this fact. In their words, “one interpre-
tation of this evidence is that “smart” money appropriately anticipates net
buying by the “dumb” money: large investors tend to purchase announcing
stocks prior to the announcement and then sell them (at inflated prices) to
the smaller investors on the announcement date”.
To us, this provides ideal ground for testing the PIN variable. To the
extent that the PIN is successful at estimating the probability of informed
trading, we expect the PIN for the days preceding EADs to be significantly
higher, in the statistical and economic sense, than the PIN calculated for the
days after EADs. Our empirical work shows that this is not the case.
In what follows, we give a more detailed account of the PIN variable as
it appears in EHO (2002)[Section I], we describe our data and methodology
[Section II], we present the empirical tests and our results [Section III] and
conclude [Section IV].
3Frazzini and Lamont classify as large trades worth $50,000 or more and as small,
trades worth $5,000 or less.
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I. The PIN variable
Although the PIN variable is defined and explained in EHO (2002) here we
present it again for the purpose of completeness. In constructing the PIN,
EHO start from a microstructure model that assumes informed and unin-
formed traders, as well as an equally uninformed market maker. In this
setup, information events occur independently on a daily basis with prob-
ability α. The news about a stock is either good (with probability 1 − δ)
or bad (probability δ). The market maker’s job is to set prices and execute
orders as they arrive. The informed traders will buy a stock for which the
news is good and will sell otherwise, on the same day the information event
occurs. The rate of informed trading is µ and the rates of uninformed buy
and sell orders are ²b and ²s respectively. Figure 2 (taken from EHO(2002))
gives a graphical representation of this model.
The next step is to make some assumptions about the conditional distri-
bution of the number of buy and sell orders that occur on a given trading
day (i.e. after nature has decided whether there is an information event and
whether the news is good or bad). EHO assume the number of buy and sell
trades to be independent of one another, to follow Poisson processes for a
particular trading day and to be independent across trading days. Thus, the
unconditional likelihood function for a single trading day is a mixed process
that takes the form
L(θ|B, S) =(1− α)e−²b ²
B
b
B!
e−²s
²Ss
S!
+ αδe−²b
²Bb
B!
e−(µ+²s)
(µ+ ²s)
S
S!
+ α(1− δ)e−(µ+²b) (µ+ ²b)
B
B!
e−²s
²Ss
S!
(1)
where B and S are the total number of buy and sell trades respectively
and θ = (α, µ, ²b, ²s, δ) is the parameter vector. Given the assumption of
independence across days, the likelihood function over I days is
V = L(θ|M) =
I∏
i=1
L(θ|Bi, Si) (2)
where (Bi, Si) are the day i trades and M = ((B1, S1), · · · , (BI , SI)) is the
data set. Maximizing expression (2) over θ is a way to estimate the parame-
ters of the model. Using these parameters, we see that the expected number
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of informed trades in a given day is αµ and the expected total number of
trades is αµ + ²s + ²b. Thus, the fraction of informed trades to the total
number of trades, is a way to estimate the probability of informed trading.
Accordingly, EHO (2002) define PIN as:
PIN =
αµ
αµ+ ²s + ²b
(3)
Simulations show that the PIN takes on high values if there are relatively
big and infrequent jumps in the number of trades. Intuitively, such jumps
are more likely due to the arrival of good or bad news about a stock and
to informed traders reacting by making buy or sell trades in that stock. It
is important to mention that PIN does not generally take high values when
there are frequent jumps. Although it is correlated with the coefficient of
variation of the number of trades, this correlation is weak (0.26). Rather,
PIN is big whenever there is a sharp contrast between the trading volume on
a given day and that of the surrounding days.
II. Methodology and Data
A. Data
We construct our data set in the following way: At the end of January
of every year, we sort by market capitalization all NYSE-traded ordinary
common stocks (i.e. we use only CRSP share codes 10 and 11 to exclude
financial companies, foreign companies, mutual funds, ADRs etc.) We record
the ticker symbols of the 600 smallest companies, and obtain for these ticker
symbols a time series of quotes and trades and a time series of EADs. Both
of these series have a length of 13 years (1993-2005). The data on trades and
quotes comes from the Trade and Quote (TAQ) database, while the EADs
are from Compustat North America-Industrial Quarterly.
We only use NYSE traded stocks in accordance with EHO (2002), because
this venue most closely resembles their market microstructure model. We
restrict ourselves to the lower end of the size distribution for two reasons.
First, smaller companies have fewer trades and thus calculating the PIN
is computationally feasible for a larger number of ticker-years. Second, as
EHO (2005) claim, the microstructure model probably describes better the
informational environment of small stocks. For instance, the assumption of
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one information event per day seems more fitting for small rather than large
firms.
To facilitate comparison with the PINs calculated by David Easley4 we
further restrict our sample to those firms for which there is a one-to-one
correspondence between their tickers and PERMNOs. In doing this, we drop
42 firms and 185 ticker-years from our sample. Next, we subject the data
to additional cleaning by eliminating all ticker-years which have less than
80 observations i.e, less than 80 days of buy and sell data. We do this to
ensure that there are enough data points for the PIN calculation in any given
ticker-year. Finally, we merge for each stock the EADs with the daily buy/sell
orders and drop these ticker-years for which there are fewer than 33 or more
than 130 trading days between any consecutive EADs.5 Very frequent or rare
earnings announcements are usually associated with extraordinary events
such as mergers and defaults, the effect of which on our results we would like
to avoid. After this final data cleaning step, we are left with a total of 4706
ticker-years.
B. Buy-Sell Classification of Trades
To classify trades as buyer or seller-initiated, we apply a slightly mod-
ified version of the Lee-Ready (1991) algorithm. In its original version, the
algorithm classifies a trade as a buy (sell) if it is executed above (below) the
midpoint of the bid and ask prices. The rationale is that a trade executed
close to the bid (ask) price is more likely to be a sell (buy). For the trades
that lie on the bid-ask midpoint, the “tick test” is used for their classification.
This procedure classifies a midpoint trade as a buy if it is executed at a higher
price than the previous trade (i.e., if it is an “uptick”) and as a sell if it is ex-
ecuted at a lower price (“downtick”). If the previous trade is executed at the
same price, the tick test looks at the next most recent trade until it reaches
a change in the trade price (“zero uptick” or “zero downtick”). To apply this
algorithm, one evidently needs to match trade price data with quotes. Lee
and Ready suggest matching trade prices with 5-second-old quotes because
prior to the computerization of the trade process, new quotes would often be
reported prior to the prices of trades that generated them.
The way we apply the Lee-Ready algorithm is different in two respects.
4These PINs are available on David Easley’s webpage.
5The earnings announcements that satisfy the 33-130 day criterion are about 97 percent
of all earnings announcements.
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First, instead of matching trades with five second-old quotes we match trades
with the most recent quotes.6 Henker and Wang (2006) argue that this mod-
ification yields more accurate classifications of trades, due to changes in data
recording and reporting methods, brought by the introduction of computers
in the exchanges. Another modification is the way we implement the “tick
test”. We use the same methodology for an uptick or downtick, but for
a zero-uptick/downtick instead of classifying a trade based on the previous
price change, we give it the same classification as the previous classifiable
trade. We do this because it often takes a long time (e.g. more than a day)
until there is a price change.7
One characteristic of the stock trades and quotes in TAQ is that they are
pooled from several different exchanges on which some NYSE stocks happen
to trade as well. For instance, the most recent quote for a stock trade that oc-
curred in Boston may come from the Pacific or the Midwest exchange, which
is not necessarily the same with the most recent quote in Boston. However,
this does not create any problems, since the quotes of any exchange are visi-
ble to all other exchanges. Thus, we can safely use the raw TAQ data as an
input to the Lee-Ready algorithm.
C. PIN Calculation
Maximizing expression (2) is a challenging task even for a powerful computer
because for large numbers of buy (B) or sell (S) trades, the system easily
overflows. In accordance with EHO (2005), we maximize instead
L((B, S)|θ) =
T∑
t=1
[−²b − ²s +Mt(ln xb + ln xs) +Bt ln(µ+ ²b) + St ln(µ+ ²s)]
+
T∑
t=1
ln[α(1− δ)e−µxSt−Mts x−Mtb + αδe−µxBt−MTb x−Mts + (1− α)xSt−Mts xBt−Mtb ]
(4)
where Mt = min(Bt, St) + max(Bt, St)/2, xs =
²s
µ+²s
and xb =
²b
µ+²b
. This
transformation allows us to compute PINs for a larger number of ticker-years
because it eliminates large numbers such as the factorials of the number of
6That is, we match trades with one second-old quotes because this is the frequency at
which the data is updated in TAQ.
7Zero upticks and zero downticks account for less than 1 percent of trades in our sample.
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buy and sell orders. Nevertheless, the overflow problem persists and the
computer is not able to compute PINs for all of the 4706 ticker-years.
To make sure that our code is correct, we compute the PINs for the same
ticker-years that we can unambiguously match with the PERMNO-years on
David Easley’s website. It turns out that 4499 ticker-years can be matched
and the resulting PINs have a correlation of 0.71 with those computed by
Easley.
III. Empirical Tests and Results
The general methodology in our empirical tests is to split the time peri-
ods between EADs (excluding the EADs themselves) into “proximate” and
“distant” ones, the first half of a period between EADs being distant and the
second half being proximate. The purpose of partitioning the time line is to
compute PINs separately for proximate and distant periods and then com-
pare them with each other. Figure 3 illustrates this procedure. Since there is
higher information asymmetry and thus higher probability of informed trad-
ing prior to earnings announcements, we would expect the PINs calculated
over proximate periods to be significantly higher than the PINs calculated
over distant periods. To make our PIN calculations reliable, we require each
of our proximate and distant time segments to contain at least 28 trading
days.8.
Since the PIN is calculated from trade data, it is instructive to first see
how the trade data of our sample behaves around EADs. Figure 4 depicts
the average number of daily trades as a function of the time since the last
EAD. Since distant and proximate periods are defined relative to the next
EAD, the first half of the graph depicts distant days and the second half
depicts proximate days. The most striking feature of this graph is the well
documented increase in trading volume on and immediately after an EAD.
In our data, the average number of trades drops from around 50 on the first
day after an earnings announcement to an average between 30 and 40 for the
rest of the time. Since the PIN variable is sensitive to changes in trading
volume, this means that the PINs calculated over distant periods should be
affected by this regularity. We discuss this effect in more detail below when
we perform our tests.
The fact that for a particular stock the PIN over a distant period is
8Easley, Kiefer and O’Hara (1997) calculate PINs using data over 30 days
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probably correlated with the PIN of the corresponding proximate period,
suggests the use of a two sample paired t-test. This test is fitting as it
does not require the two populations (proximate and distant PINs) to be
independent of one another. The results are shown in Table I, Panel A. Ev-
idently, the null hypothesis of equality between proximate and distant PINs
(PINprox = PINdist) cannot be rejected. Not only is the t-statistic small
(-0.67) but the point estimates have the opposite sign of what would be ex-
pected if PIN worked.
One could argue that the variation in trading volume after an EAD might
contaminate our test because it biases upward the PIN of distant periods.
In principle, this should not be an issue because to the extent that PIN is
intended to capture the probability of informed trading only, but instead it is
sensitive to other regularities in the trade data, then this is a problem of PIN.
However, to give PIN a chance and to eliminate the possibility that PIN fails
to work only in the case of EADs because of this particular trading pattern,
we repeat the above test excluding the first four trading days after an earn-
ings announcement. The results (shown in Table I, Panel B) are now more
strongly against the null which is rejected at 5 percent significance in favor
of either of the alternatives that PINprox < PINdist or PINprox 6= PINdist.
These results raise the question of whether the standard errors allow for
economically significant changes in the PIN before and after EADs. In their
asset pricing regressions with PIN, EHO (2002) estimate that a level increase
in PIN by 0.1 should increase the stock’s required return by 2.5% per annum.
The upper bound of the 95% confidence interval of the first test that we re-
port, is 0.0015. This corresponds to a negligible premium of 4 bps per annum
for bearing the risk of trading against informed investors prior to earnings
announcements.
The structure of our data implies that there may be a cross-sectional
correlation among proximate/distant PINs. Intuitively, any large purchase
of a big number of stocks by an institutional investor will cause the PINs of
all these stocks to increase and us to underestimate the true standard error.
To see if this is a problem with our data, we computed the cross-sectional
averages of proximate and distant PINs and then we calculated the standard
error of the average (across time) difference of these cross-sectional differ-
ences. The resulting standard error (0.01) although higher, is still too small
to allow for the PIN difference to be economically significant.
In its original version (e.g. EHO (2002) and most other related papers)
the PIN variable is computed for each stock using as many as 250 trading
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days which corresponds to one year of data. On the contrary, the PINs we
have calculated so far use an average of 34 trading days. So, our next step
is to do the empirical tests on PINs that have been calculated using a bigger
number of trading days. To achieve this, we combine for every ticker-year all
the “distant” segments together, calculate the PIN over this combined period
and do the same with the “proximate” periods. This procedure is illustrated
in Figure 5. After we have obtained “distant” and “proximate” PINs for each
ticker-year, we again perform a paired t-test of mean equality. We repeat this
exercise using thirds instead of halves9 as well as as 10-day time intervals.
We do this because as we move to longer proximate and distant periods, we
should expect other public information events (e.g. appointment of a new
CEO) to generate informed trading and therefore changes in PIN. However,
these other events being random, are equally likely to lie on a proximate or
a distant period. Thus, the longer the time segments are, the more noise our
data contains and the less likely it is for PIN to be significantly different in
one or the other period. In the case of “thirds” the PINs are effectively cal-
culated over at least 70 trading days and in the case of 10-day time intervals
the PINs are computed using data from more than 30 trading days. The
summary statistics of all our different samples are given in Table II.
One concern about our methodology might be whether it is correct to
calculate PINs over time periods that are the union of time intervals which
lie afar from each other. One can easily think of situations where the re-
sulting calculation is misleading. Suppose for example that in each of the
time intervals/segments, the total number of buys and sells does not fluctu-
ate significantly, but is nevertheless very different from interval to interval.
In such a case, the true PIN should be small, since there is no evidence of
informed trading in each time interval. However, when these time intervals
are combined, it will look as if there are significant changes in the number
of buy/sell orders and the PIN over the combined period will probably be
high. Figure 6 illustrates this potential problem. However, our combined
proximate and distant periods are formed from alternating proximate and
distant time segments. This implies that even if the previously described
bias exists, it will be equally pronounced for the combined proximate and
distant periods.
Consistent with our previous results, these tests also show (Table III)
9Now the first third is distant and the last third is proximate. Each third is about 20
days. The data in the middle third is discarded.
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that the average PINs computed over proximate periods are not only insignif-
icantly different from the average PINs computed over distant periods, but
they also tend to be lower. We also perform the tests omitting the first four
days after earnings announcements (Panel B). As before, the t-statistics can-
not reject the null hypothesis of mean equality of PINprox and PINdist while
the confidence interval bounds exclude the possibility that PINprox−PINdist
can take on economically significant positive values.
IV. Conclusion
Despite the fact that so far there has been some weak empirical evidence
that PIN works, there are many theoretical objections as to whether it actu-
ally should work. In constructing the PIN, EKOP (1996) and EHO (2002)
make some strong assumptions about the occurrence of information events
and the behavior of market participants. On the other hand, PIN ignores the
actual size of any given trade. In this paper we have attempted to directly
test whether PIN is a variable that can be trusted in providing an accurate
estimate of the probability of informed trading. In this direction, we have
shown that it does not significantly change before and after EADs. To the
extent that our intuition and the available empirical evidence about more
informed trading prior to major public information events - such as earnings
announcements - is correct, the results of our work should caution researchers
about the use of PIN. We feel this is important, since the PIN has been and
is being used as an explanatory variable in many research articles.
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                Figure 1: Abnormal trading volume (small and large trades) around earnings   
                                 announcement dates. Abnormal Net Buy is the average (across  
                                 firms) ratio of buyer-initiated volume minus  seller-initiated volume  
                                 for a firm, divided by  the average daily volume of the same firm  
                                 over the previous 250 trading days. Taken from Frazzini and Lamont  
                                 (2006). See Frazzini and Lamont (2006) for more details.  
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 Buy Arrival Rate: εb
 
 
Information Event Does Not Occur  (1 – α) 
Information Event Occurs  α 
Signal High  (1 - δ) 
Signal Low  δ 
Sell Arrival Rate: εs + μ
Buy Arrival Rate: εb + μ
Sell Arrival Rate: εs
Buy Arrival Rate: εb
Sell Arrival Rate: εsOnce per Day 
Figure 2: Tree diagram of the trading process, EHO (2002) 
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                               Figure 3: The timeline split into distant and proximate “segments”. 
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                                Figure 4: Average number of daily trades as a function of the time since 
                                                   the last earnings announcement. 
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Table I: Paired t-test Results  Panel A Panel B ("minus 4") 
N (tickersegments) 9614 9616 
average(PINs) 0.2295 0.2303 0.2296 0.2321 
average PINproximate - average PINdistant -0.0008 -0.0025 
standard error 0.0011 0.0012 se
gm
en
ts
 
t-statistics (-0.67) (-2.12) 
 
 
              Table I : This table presents the average PINs per proximate/distant time segment, their  
                              difference and the two-sample paired t-statistics for testing mean equality.  
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                 COMBINED DISTANT PERIODS            COMBINED PROXIMATE PERIODS 
                                            PINDISTANT                                                      PINPROXIMATE 
 
           Figure 5: We compute PINs over time intervals that have been created by   
                             combining distant and proximate (relative to EADs) periods.   
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Summary statistics of the sample
proximate distant proximate distant
average # of trading days average # of trading days 71.07 73.28
(stdev) (stdev) (17.85) (15.45)
average # of trades 72.30 71.24 average # of trades 38.49 39.90
(109.82) (107.80) (49.67) (51.11)
           - buys 36.51 36.10            - buys 19.61 20.41
(61.16) (60.21) (28.19) (29.12)
           - sells 35.78 35.13            - sells 18.88 19.50
(59.68) (58.77) (26.22) (26.90)
average # of trading days 107.78 110.33 average # of trading days 34.41 35.42
(stdev) (26.30) (23.60) (stdev) (8.86) (7.67)
average # of trades 38.75 39.40 average # of trades 38.42 41.92
(50.05) (50.23) (49.18) (54.01)
           - buys 19.71 20.10            - buys 19.55 21.50
(28.44) (28.63) (27.88) (30.74)
           - sells 19.04 19.29            - sells 18.87 20.41
(26.40) (26.46) (26.06) (28.35)
period
10
 d
ay
s
ha
lv
es
33.50
period
th
ird
s
se
gm
en
ts
(5.09)
 
 
 
                      Table II: Summary statistics of trading days, buys, sells and total trades for    
                                      recombined halves, thirds and 10-day periods. 
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Figure 6:    The above graphs illustrate the potential for wrong PIN  
                    calculations when large changes in the number of buy/sell 
                                 orders in the combined periods are due to different overall 
                                 levels of volume in each of the distant/proximate periods.  
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Table III: Paired t-test Results Panel A Panel B ("minus4")
(two-sample paired t-test)  proximate distant proximate distant
            
N (tickeryears) 2840 2861 
average(PINs) 0.2291 0.2297 0.2294 0.2295
average PINproximate - average PINdistant -0.0005 -0.0001 
standard error 0.0013 0.0013 
ha
lv
es
 
t-statistics (-0.39) (-0.08) 
            
            
N (tickeryears) 2840 2861 
average(PINs) 0.2291 0.2297 0.2391 0.2395
average PINproximate - average PINdistant -0.0006 -0.0003 
standard error 0.0014 0.0017 
th
ird
s 
t-statistics (-0.46) (-0.20) 
            
            
N (tickeryears) 2840 2861 
average(PINs) 0.2288 0.2297 0.2555 0.2565
average PINproximate - average PINdistant -0.0009 -0.0010 
standard error 0.0014 0.0020 1
0 
da
ys
 
t-statistics (-0.69) (-0.47) 
            
 
 
Table III : This table presents the average PINs per proximate/distant recombined period, their  
                  difference and the two-sample paired t-statistics for testing mean equality. 
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